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Acting Without "Just Cause":
An Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's
Decision in United States v. Symington
BY JAMES R. COLTHARP, JR.!

INTRODUCTION

oth "Article III and the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantee to all federal criminal defendants the
right to a trial by jury."' Early interpretation of this right led
to the common law rule that a judge, when faced with a juror who became
incapacitated or disqualified during a criminal trial, had to discharge
the juror and declare a nstnal.2 This rigid practice led to a substantial
waste of resources by the court, prosecution, and defense-an effect
*J.D. expected 2001, Umversity of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
William H. Fortune, Robert G. Lawson Professor of Law of the Umversity of
Kentucky, for directing him to the Symington case, and Allison I. Connelly,
Assistant Professor of Law and Director ofthe Elder Law Climc of the Umversity
of Kentucky, for her help in improvmg tus piece.
'Frank A. Bacelli, Note, United States v. Thomas: When the Preservationof
JurorSecrecy DuringDeliberationsOutweighs the Ability to Dismiss a Jurorfor
Nullification,48 CATH. U. L. REv 125, 125 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The tral of all Crimes, except m Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury. '); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury.. 1.
'See Jeffrey T. Baker, CriminalLaw-Post-SubmissionJurorSubstitution in
the Third Circuit: Serving JudicialEconomy While Undermininga Defendant's
Rights to anImpartialJuryUnderRule24(c), 41 ViL. L.REV 1213, 1213(1996);
Joshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution of Alternate Jurors in
Federal Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure23(b) and 24(c), 55 FORDHAM L. REV 861, 861 (1987); Douglas J.

McDermott, Note, Substitution of Alternate Jurors During Deliberations and
Implicationson the Rights ofLitigants:The ReginaldDennyTrial,35 B.C. L. REV
847,847 (1994).
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that increased dramatically as the trial continued over a longer period of
time?
In an effort to alleviate substantial amounts of this waste, the Supreme
Court and Congress adopted Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b)
and 24(c) in 1946.4 Rule 23(b), which has been amended three times at
least in part to avoid mistnals;5 allows a trial to proceed with less than
twelve jurors under certain circumstances. 6 Its counterpart, Rule 24(e),
allows (among other things) an alternate juror to replace a juror who is
"unable or disqualified" to serve.7 This Rule has been amended three times,

3 Baker, supra note
4Id. at 1214.

2, at 1213.

5 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23; id. 23 advisory committee's note (1983); id. 23
advisory committee's note (1977); id.23 advisory committee's note (1966).
6 Id.23(b).
In its entirety, Rule 23(b) reads:
() JURY OF LESS THAN TWELVE. Juries shall be of 12 but at any time
before verdict the parties may stipulate m writing with the approval of the
court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a valid
verdict may be returned by a jury of less than 12 should the court find it
necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause after trial
commences. Even absent such stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to
excuse ajuror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict,
m the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the
remaining 11 jurors.
7 Id. 24(c).
Rule 24(c) states:
(c) ALTERNATE JURORS. (1) In general. The court may empanel no more
than 6 jurors, m addition to the regular jury, to sit as alternate jurors. An
alternate juror, m the order called, shall replace ajuror who becomes or is
found to be unable or disqualified to perform juror duties. Alternate jurors
shall (i) be drawn in the same manner, (i) have the same qualifications, (iii)
be subject to the same examination and challenges, and (iv) take the same
oath as regular jurors. An alternate juror has the same functions, powers,
facilities and privileges as a regular juror.
(2) Peremptorychallenges.In addition to challenges otherwise provided by
law, each side is entitled to I additional peremptory challenge if 1 or 2
alternate jurors are empaneled, 2 additional peremptory challenges if 3 or
4 alternate jurors are empaneled, and 3 additional peremptory challenges if
5 or6 alternate jurors are empaneled. The additionalperemptory challenges
may be used to remove an alternate juror only, and the other peremptory
challenges allowed by these rules may not be used to remove an alternate
juror.
(3) Retention of alternatejurors. When the jury retires to consider the
verdict, the court m its discretion may retain the alternate jurors during
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apparently m attempts to promotejudicial economy and avoidunnecessary
mistrals 8 Particularly, the most recent amendment of Rule 24(c) harmoized the Rule with a growing body of case law that disregarded a
section of the former amendment, which required a judge to discharge all
alternate jurors at deliberation and prohibited post-submission juror
substitution
Thus, in light of the increasingly lenient revisions of Rules 23(b) and
24(c) and growing case law, there is a clearly discemable trend toward
promoting judicial economy and avoiding unnecessary mistrials. The Ninth
Circuit, however, in UnitedStatesv. Symmngton, 10 buckedthat trendby both
disregarding the usual abuse of discretion standard for Rule 23(b) decisions
andmisapplying the measure for "just cause" underthe Rule. InSymington,
the trial court disnssed ajuror who, from all accounts ofher fellow jurors,
was unable to participate meaningfully m deliberations. 1 Despite the
consistency with wnch the jurors questioned her lucidity without ever
mentioning or alluding to her beliefs, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that no "justcause" existed for her dismissal.12 By ruling as it did, the Ninth
Circuit made juror dismissal nearly npossible in situations where
dismissal is sought for any reasonnot unquestionably independent from the
merits.
This Note employs four sections to develop this thesis. Part I charts the
evolution ofthe two Federal Rules of Crnimal Procedure that involve postsubmission juror disnssal and substitution, Rules 23 and 24.13 Pat I[
evaluates the current understanding of 'just cause" for juror dismissal

deliberations. If the court decides to retain the alternate jurors, it shall
ensure that they do not discuss the case with any other person unless and
until they replace a regular juror during deliberations. If an alternate
replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the court shall instruct the
jury to begin its deliberations anew.
8 See id., id. 24 advisory committee's note (1999); id. 24 advisory committee's
note (1966).
9See mfra notes 23-24. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (current version), with
id. 24(c) (1987) (amended 1999). The latterread: "Altematejurors... shallreplace
jurors who,pnorto the time thejury retiresto considerits verdict,become or are
An alternate juror
found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties.
who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to
consider its verdict." Id.24(c) (1987) (amended 1999) (emphasis added).
10 United States v. Symmgton, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).
11 See infra notes 106-09, 127-34 and accompanying text; infra note 141.
12 See Symmngton, 195 F.3d at 1088.
3 See infra notes 17-41 and accompanying text
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under Rule 23(b). 14 Part Impresents the facts and holding of United States
v. Symzngton, and gives an assessment ofthe court's decision. 15 Finally, the
Note examines the policy implications of Symington. 6
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMAL PROCEDURE 23 AND 24
The early versions of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and
24(c) were far less flexible than those currently in place. Under the initial
Rule 23(b), a verdict could be returned by fewer than twelve jurors only
upon stipulation of the parties. 17 Furthermore, Rule 24(c) previously
required all alternate jurors to be disussed at the start of deliberations."8
Therefore, if ajuror were disnssed during deliberations and either of the
parties refused to consent to an eleven-juror verdict, a mistrial was the
court's only option." The high cost of this mandatory outcome20 was
eventually alleviated by the 1983 amendment to Rule 23, which allowed a
valid verdict to be returned by the remaining eleven jurors absent party
stipulation, "if the court [found] it necessary to excuse ajuror for just cause
after the jury ha[d] retired to consider its verdict."'
By allowing a valid eleven-juror verdict either at judicial discretion or
upon the previously allowed party stipulation, the 1983 amendment to Rule
23 substantially reduced a defendant's power to obtain a mistrial when a
juror was disnussed after deliberations had begun. Despite this substantial
deprivation of a defendant's power, the constitutionality of Rule 23(b) is
unquestioned by the courts.' Thus, in allowing a verdict to be rendered by

4 See znfra

notes 42-100 and accompanying text.
15 See infranotes 101-62 and accompanying text.
16See mnfra notes 163-76 and accompanying text
'7 FED. K.CRIM. P 23 advisory committee's note (1983).
1d. 24 advisory committee's note (1999).
9
'
id. 23 advisory committee's note (1983).
20 See
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
21 FED.
K CRIM.P 23(b).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Almad, 974 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d 132,134 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith,
789 F.2d 196,205 (3d Cir. 1986). The Supreme Courthas never directly addressed
the constitutionality of Rule 23(b), but its ruling m Williams v. Florida,399 U.S.
78, 98-100 (1970), that a twelve-member jury is not a constitutional unperative
provides strong evidence that Rule 23(b) would pass constitutional muster.
Accordingly, lower courts have used the Court's Williams decision as authority for
Rule 23(b). SeeA hmad,974 F.2d at 1164; Armo, 834 F.2d at 134; Smith, 789 F.2d
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a jury of less than twelve without the consent of both parties, the 1983
amendment promoted judicial economy and efficiency at the expense of
defendant control.
Following the 1983 amendment to Rule 23(b), courts frequentlybegan
to overextend their power under the Rules by downplaying or outright
ignoring Rule 24(c)'s dual mandates-to discharge alternate jurors' and
to only replace jurors "prior to the time the jury retires to consider its
verdict."24 This practice led to a branch of precedent-setting scenarios
where Rule 24(c)'s clear mandates could be disregarded.Y Even with
widely-accepted judicial exceptions to Rule 24(c)'s clear mandates,

at 205.
23FED.R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (1987) (amended 1999). Instances ofjudicial disregard
of this requirement are many. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725
(1993) (holding that it is not reversible error to allow alternate jurors to sit in
during deliberations); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1286-88 (1st Cir.
1996) (holding that it is harmless error to retain alternate jurors in violation of Rule
24(c)); Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1574-76 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing
alternatejurors to be retained and separately sequestered); United States v. Rubio,
727 F.2d 786, 799 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting alternate jurors to be retained and
sequestered); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding
harmless error m retaining alternate jurors in violation of Rule 24(c)).
FED. R.CRIM.P 24(c) (1987) (amended 1999). This post-submission prohibition, like the discharge requirement, was also frequently disregarded by the
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418,421 (5th Cir. 1992)
(allowing juror substitution after deliberations because defendant was not
prejudiced); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446,448 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding
post-submission substitution acceptable when defendant expiessly demanded that
alternate be impaneled rather than continue with only 11 jurors); Peek v. Kemp,
784 F.2d 1479, 1485 (1lth Cir. 1986) (permitting substitution after deliberations
where there is no prejudice); United States v Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.
1985) (permitting substitution after deliberations where there is no prejudice);
Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding post-submission
substitution procedure "preserved the 'essential feature' of thejury"). Butsee, e.g.,
United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1155-57 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding postsubmission substitution impernissible absent defendant's consent); United States
v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972) (finding presence of alternate during
deliberations grounds for mistrial).
For a discussion of the merits of the judicially-improvised post-submission
juror substitution under the prior version of Rule 24(c), see Grunat, supra note 2
(maintaining that post-submission juror substitution detrimentally affected the
rights of defendants).
2s See supranotes 23-24.
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however, juror substitution remained a less favored method of avoiding a
mistrial than sunply proceeding with eleven jurors2 6 -despite the small
practical difference between the two.27

In 1999, Rule 24 was amended to reflect the growing approval for postsubmission juror substitution by makng post-submission substitution an
equally viable alternative to proceeding with the eleven remammgjurors.s
This amendment allowed the trial court discretionary authority to retain
2 See, e.g., 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-2.7, commentary
(2d ed. 1980) ("llt is not desirable to allow ajuror who is unfamiliar with the prior
deliberations to suddenly join the group and participate in the voting without the
benefit of earlier group discussion.'); 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICEANDPROCEDURE § 388, at393 (2d ed. 1982) ("To permit substitution of
an alternate after deliberations have begun would require either that the alternate
participate though he has missed part of the jury discussion, or that he sit m with
the jury in every case on the chance he might be needed. Either course is subject

to practical difficulty and to possible constitutional objections."); FED. R. CRIM. P

23 advisory committee's note (1983) ("[T]he judgment oftheAdvisory Committee
is that it is far better to permit the deliberations to continue with ajury of 11 than
to make a substitution [after post-submission disnssal ofajuror]."). For a general
discussion of the ills of post-submission juror substitution, see Baker, supra note
2, at 1247-53, and McDermott, supranote 2, at 878-82.
27A central
concern ofthose opposmg post-submissionjuror substitution is that
the existing jurors would unduly influence a new juror and subvert his free will.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P 23 advisory committee's note (1983). As a practical
matter, however, a defendant is no more disadvantaged by the substitution of an
alternate juror than by continuing deliberations with the remaining eleven jurors.
Obviously, if the other eleven jurors have already decided upon a guilty verdict
with the dismissedjuror representing the lone holdout, the defendant gains nothing
by proceeding with eleven jurors instead of adding an alternate to the panel. In fact,
substituting an alternate for the already-dismissedjuror represents a better option
for the defendant in this situation, as there exists at least a possibility that the
alternate will insist upon acquittal. If no alternate were seated, however, the eleven
would be sure to convict.
2 The most recent amendment to Rule 24 went into effect on December 1,
1999, after Symington had been decided. Nonetheless, the trend toward judicial
economy was apparent at the adjudication, not only because of the 1983 change to
Rule 23(b) and the use of post-submission juror substitution in most circuits
(including the Ninth Circuit), see Baker, supranote 2, at 1215 n.10, 1216, but also
because the change to Rule 24 had already been approved by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court order approving the amendments was issued on April 26,
1999-nearly two months before the June 22,1999 Symington decision. Therefore,
it is quite likely that the judges of Symington knew, or should have known, of the
upcoming change.

2000-2001]

UNITED STATES V SYMINGTON

alternate jurors after submission, so long as the alternates were not allowed
to discuss the case with anyone. 9 As a protection of the "sanctity of the
deliberative process,"30 the Rule further states that ifan alternate is called
to sit as ajuror after deliberations have already begun, the jury must "begin
its deliberations anew." 3'
This change to Rule 24 furtherpromotedjudicial economy by affording
a trialjudge the additional option of replacing a disqualified juror with an
alternate at the deliberation stage without fear of mistrial or reversal.32
Much like the 1983 amendment to Rule 23, the 1999 change to Rule 24
continued the trend away from the absolute and unyielding protection of a
twelve-member jury34 and toward a goal of facilitating unhindered
deliberations and avoiding mistrials. The judicial system-ffirst entirely
unable to conduct deliberations without twelve jurors, 31 and later only able
to do so upon stipulation ofboth parties3 6 -gainedthe authority to continue
deliberations at its discretion.37 At the same time, the treatment of alternate
29 FED. R.CRIM.

P. 24(c)(3).

I31Id. 24 advisory committee's note (1999).
Id.24(c)(3).
32

See id.

id. 23 advisory committee's note (1983).
4The Supreme Court's ruling m Williams v. Florida,399 U.S. 78, 89,98-100
(1970), that ajury of twelve was a mere "historical accident' not mandated by the
Constitution created the impetus for this trend. See supra note 22. The Court
subsequently restricted this holding by ruling in Ballew v. Georgia,435 U.S. 223,
239 (1978), that a jury must contain at least six members to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
As for the unanimity requirement, the Court has been somewhat more
protective. While the Court has recognized that jury unanimity does not mure to
state crimmal trials, a plurality ofthe Court indicated, albeit in dicta, that unammity
remained a constitutional imperative in federal prosecutions. See Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodacav. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); cf.FED.
R. CRIM.P 31(a) ("The verdict shall be unanimous." (emphasis added)). Most
lower courts view the unanimity requirement as so sacrosanct that it cannot be
waived. See United States v. Smedes, 760 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Pachay, 711 F.2d488, 490-93 (2dCir. 1983); United States v. Moms, 612
F.2d483,488-89 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1340-42
(9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507, 511-12 (3rd Cir. 1978).
Butsee Sanchez v. United States, 782 F.2d 928,932-34 (1lth Cir. 1986) (allowing
waiver
"in exceptional circumstances").
35
See supranote 2 and accompanying text.
36
FED. R.CRIM. P 23(b) (1976) (amended 1983); id. 23 advisory committee's
note37(1977).
FED. K.CRIM. P. 23(b); id. 23 advisory committee's note (1983).
13 See
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jurors evolved from a Rule that mandated their dismissal at the start of
deliberationss into one that allowed substitution under certain circumstances,3 9 then ultimately to a version allowing juror substitution at the
court's discretion.! With these revisions, the trend toward judicial
economy became unmistakable. It was just as these constraints upon
judicial economy were relaxing to afford trial judges more flexibility in
post-submission juror dismissal and replacement that the Ninth Circuit
styned the trend's momentum with its decision in United States v.
Symington. '
H. "JUST CAUSE" UNDER RULE 23(B)
Although 1983's amendment to Rule 23(b) allowed a trial court to
excuse ajuror without party stipulation, the Rule limited thejudge's power
by requiring that the juror only be dismissed for "just cause." 42 The
determination of "just cause" for dismissal was left to the discretion ofthe
trial court,43 making "[a]pplication of Rule 23(b) hinge[ ] on the trial
judge's determination of 'just cause."'"
With the determination of "just cause" left to the courts and not the
Rule writers, an overarching definition ofthe term has developed ona caseby-case basis as new scenarios have arisen.45 Consequently, a variety of
circumstances have met the "just cause" threshold." Generally, however,
'just cause" under Rule 23(b) has fallen into three different categones-juror illness, sudden juror unavailability during deliberations, and
juror inability or unwillingness to return an impartial verdict. 47
Illness, expressly mentioned in the Notes of the Advisory Committee,4"
is clearly withn the purview of "just cause." ' 9 Not surprisingly, a juror's

3 1Id.
24(c)
39 See, e.g.,

(1987) (amended 1999).
United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983).
4
FED.
R.
CRIM.
P. 24(c)(3).
41
United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).
42
FED. P, CRIM. P 23(b).
43Id.

Bacelli, supra note 1, at 145-46.
4United States v. Araujo, 62 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1995).
See mnfra notes 47-100 and accompanying text.
47 Bacelli, supra
note 1, at 146.
41 See FED. R. CPIM. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1983).
49 See United States
v. Glover, 21 F.3d 133, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding
the dismissal of an ill juror); United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1249-51
(lth Cir. 1990) (allowing dismissal of a juror whose repeated illness led to an
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physical mability to participate in the deliberation, whether by illness or
injury, remains the most common reason for excusal.50 A serious injury
requiring medical attention,"' an ankle mjury,5 2 and mjunes sustained in an
automobile accidents have all provided 'ust cause" under Rule 23(b).
Certain physical disabilities have also been included under "just cause,"
including a substantial hearing npairment. 54
Like physical illness or mjury, mental illness or incapacity has also
been grounds for "just cause."I s Jurors have been properly dismissed
because of a mental instability and mability to engage m rational discus5
sion,5 depressions and a suicidal and paranoid mental condition.
Furthermore, a trial court's dismissal of a juror who was "nervous and
upset, had been crying during deliberations, had taken a tranquilizer, and
whose health was at risk if she continued with the deliberations satisfied
the 'lust cause" requirement.5 9
Similarly, the "just cause" of Rule 23(b) has been applied in instances
ofjuror unavailability I These situations have mcludedjurors who became

inability to deliberate); United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1054-61 (2d Cir.
1983) (upholding trial court's discharge of ill juror despite government's request
to take one day recess to see ifjuror recovered). Butsee United States v. Patterson,
26 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that no "just cause" existed for summary
dismissal of juror who had gone to doctor for severe chest pains).
10Bacelli, supranote 1, at 146.
11See United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1992).
See United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 513, 515-16 (4th Cir. 1995).
See United States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d 132, 134-35 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196,204-05 (3d Cir. 1986).
14 United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1996).
5See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
-1See United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1996).
See United States v. O'Brien, 898 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir. 1990).
See United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1312 (5th Cir. 1992).
51 United States v. Molinares Chams, 822 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (1st Cir.
1987).
o See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. But see United States v.
Araujo, 62 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding it an abuse of discretion to dismiss
juror due to weather-related problems); United States v. Tabacca, 924 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding it an abuse of discretion to dismiss ajurorwho was out due
to transportation difficulties but-who would be present the following day); United
States v. Essex, 734 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding it a reversible error to
dismiss a missing juror without making any effort to locate hun or discover the
reason for his absence).
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unable to deliberate because of a religious holiday,61 a business trip,62 and
even a previously planned vacation.63 Juror unavailability, like physical
illness or injury, "is not a difficult determination for a trial judge, nor does
it require an extensive inquiry into the truthfulness of the incapacity "'
Instead, the district court judge can decide whether ornot to dismiss ajuror
upon a very cursory examination.
The thirdmajor category of"just cause" under Rule 23(b) occurs when
ajuror becomes unable to render an impartial verdict. Under tins category,
found 'just cause' to dismiss jurors who, although
"[c]ourts have
available and physically capable of serving, are nonetheless found to be
' For example, jurors m multiple
unable to perform their duties properly."65
instances have been excused with "just cause" after feeling threatened by
one of the parties." In one situation, a juror was "disabled by fear" after
receiving what he thought was a threat from the defendant and was
properly dismissed. 67 Additionally, in UnitedStatesv. Casamento,6 ajuror
was properly excused after ins daughter received a suspicious and
threatening phone call.69
Dismissal under the "just cause" standard has also been held proper
where a juror is discovered to have a relationsip with one of the parties 0
or ns attorney 71"Just cause" for dismissal also existed where a juror's
unpartiality was put at issue when he learned, during deliberations, that ins
girlfriend was arrested and purportedly mistreated by police?2 Likewise, a
court has held it appropriate under Rule 23(b) to dismiss two jurors who
developed an intense and bitter dislike for each other that escalated during

61 See United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1985).
1 See United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 1994).
1 See United States v. McFarland, 34 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir. 1994).
1 Bacelli, supranote 1, at 147
65 United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 1997).
"See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1300 (2d Cir. 1991);
United
States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1186-87 (2d Cir. 1989).
67 Ruggero, 928 F.2d at 1300.
68 Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1141.
69See zd. at 1186-87
7
1 See United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461,464-66 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a juror whose wife was seen conversing with the defendant and hugging the
wife was properly dismissed).
defendant's
71
See United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284,1305-07 (lstCir. 1997) (finding
that ajuror was unable to render a fair and impartial verdict after learmng that the
defense attorney had represented his cousin).
' See United States v. Egbumwe, 969 F.2d 757, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1992).
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deliberations into shouting, finger-pointing, and name-calling. 73 Finally,
"just cause" has been held to include the discharge ofajuror for attempting
to exercise the nullification power.74
At times, the source of the impartiality concern is some readilydefinable event or relationship between juror and party 7 This makes the
source of the problem "easily identifiable and subject to investigation and
findings without intrusion into the deliberative process."'76 Such situations
include the threatening note in Ruggero," the threatening phone call in

Casamento,7 the relationshup between juror's wife and defendant in
Ramos,79 and the arrest and mistreatment of the juror's girlfriend in
Egbuniwe.0 Situations like these allow thejudge to discoverthe full extent
ofthe juror's alleged bias without risking an inquiry into the juror's views
ofthe case merits.81 Instead, thejudge's inspection focuses on the unrelated
event or relationship and its effect on the juror's ability to fairly

adjudicate.
On the other hand, when the complaint about the juror is based not
upon a readily-definable event butupon a less overt or unknown reason, the
judge is faced with a much more difficult dilemma. Such situations, which
include certain investigations into impartiality concerns and examinations
of ajuror's mental state, necessitate some sort of mqun'y into the juror's
"cognitive ability to deliberate impartially."83 The necessity of this

3See United States v. Beard, 161 F.3d 1190, 1192-94 (9th Cir. 1998).
States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A] juror
who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less subject to dismissal than is a
juror who disregards the court's instructions due to an event or relationship that
renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.").
Although the court held that "just cause" included nullification, it reversed the
defendants' convictions on other grounds. See id. at 625.
5 See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
76 Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621.
' United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 199 1); see alsosupranote
67 and accompanying text.
I United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989); see also supra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
79 United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1988); see alsosupranote 70
and accompanying text.
0United States v. Egbuinwe, 969 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1992); see alsosupranote
72 and accompanying text.
74 See United

82 Thomas,

116 F.3d at 621.

8 See id.
Bacelli, supranote 1, at 147
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investigation into thejuror's thought processes produces a conflict with the
protection ofjury secrecy "Once ajury retires to the deliberation room, the
presidingjudge's duty to dismiss jurors for nsconduct [orbias] comes into
conflict with a duty that is equally, if not more, important-safeguarding
the secrecy ofjury deliberations."' As one commentator noted:
Juror privacy is a prerequisite of free debate, without which the decisionmaking process would be crippled. For the process to work according
to theory, the participants must feel completely free to dissect the
credibility, motivations, and just deserts [sic] of other people. Sensitive
jurors will not engage in such a dialogue without some assurance that it
8s
will never reach a larger audience.
Tins commentary reflects the prevailing view toward secrecy during jury
deliberations.8 6
Because of the conflict between jury secrecy and an investigation into
potential juror bias or misconduct, courts' post-submission inquiries of
jurors must be limited to preserve secrecy. 7 Thus, an investigating court
"may not delve deeply into a juror's motivations" 8 in discerning the root
of the alleged problem with the deliberating juror, especially when the
asserted basis for dismissal is the juror's bias in refusing to join the views
of his colleagues.8 9
The judge must be careful not to probe into topics that would reveal
how the jury stands on the merits of the case, yet must conduct an inquiry

" Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618.
's Note, PublicDisclosuresofJury Deliberations,96 HARV. L. REV 886,88990 (1983) (citations omitted).
86 ee, e.g., Abraham S.
Goldstein, JurySecrecy andthe Media: he Problem
ofPostverdictInterviews,1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295,295 ("[J]urors must deliberate
m secret so that they may commumcate freely with one another, secure m the
knowledge that what they say will not be passed along to others."); see also
Thomas, 116 F.3d at 619 ("The jury as we know it is supposed to reach its
decisions in the mystery and security of secrecy; objections to the secrecy of jury
deliberations are nothing less than objections to the jury system itself."); United
States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1367 (3d Cir. 1994) (Rosenn, J., concurring) ("We
must bear in mind that the confidentiality of the thought processes of jurors, their
privileged exchange of views, and the freedom to be candid m their deliberations
are the soul of the jury system.").
17 See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 620.
8 8United States v. Brown,
823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
89
Thomas, 116 F.3d at 620-21.
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that delves deeply enough into deliberations to understand the problem and
its source.' For example, if the court suspects juror nullification, the only
foolproofway "to determine whether ajuror is bent on defiant disregard of
the applicable law [is to] intrude into the juror's thought processes."9 1 As
a result of the potentially serious problems of jury secrecy that such an
inquiry raises, the inquiry is subject to some very strict limitations:
[A] court may not delve deeply into ajuror's motivations because it may
not intrude on the secrecy of the jury's deliberations. Thus, unless the
initial request for dismissal is transparent, the court will likely prove
unable to establish conclusively the reasons underlying it. Given these
circumstances, we must hold that if the record evidence discloses any
possibility thatthe requestto discharge stems from the juror's view of the
sufficiency of the government's evidence, the court must deny the
request.92
Thus, m a nullification inquiry, for example, "[i]f the court does not find
evidence ofnullification beyond all doubt, then the investigation must stop
and the trial court may not dismiss the juror for 'just cause."'93
Although fis standard is very high, commentators and courts alike
have lauded the application of such a standard when ajuror's motivations
must be evaluated.' Furthermore, the analogous but mapplicable Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b)9 s complements the spirit oftlus standard. Federal

9 See Terence I. Lynam, Dilemma ofDismisingaJurorDurngDeliberations,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 1999, at 12, 13. Mr. Lynam was one of the attorneys

representing John Fife Symington III before the Ninth Circuit. United States v.
Symmgton, 195 F.3d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999).
9l Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621.
92

Brown, 823 F.2d at 596.

93Bacelli,

supra note 1, at 159
" See, e.g., id. at 159-60; Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086-87; cf.supra notes 9093 and accompanying text.
IlThe Rule states that:
[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing thejuror to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Tis Rule does not apply to the pre-verdict juror dismissal
evaluation because its scope is expressly limited to "an inquiry into the validity of
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Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits jurors to testify to extraneous prejudicial
information that may have influenced their decision, but prohibits them
from revealing their impressions of the trial. 6
Nonetheless, this restriction is tempered somewhat by the fact that all
trial court decisions to excuse ajuror for "just cause" under Rule 23(b) are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.Y A court has abused its discretion only
when "its 'decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when the
record contains no evidence on which [it] rationally could have based that
decision.' "M
Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, an appeals court
cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court's-making the standard
very deferential to the trial court. Therefore, the appeals court must aT=
the judgment of the lower court unless it is "left with the definite and firm
conviction that the court committed a clear error ofjudgment in reachng
its conclusion after weighing the relevant factors."" ° Thus, while the
standard that a district court must apply in evaluating "just cause" is fairly
difficult to meet, an appellate court's review of the trial court's decision is
quite limited by the "abuse of discretion" nature of its examination.

a verdict or indictment." Id. (emphasis added).
96 Id.

97 See FED. P, CRIM. P. 23(b) ("[l]fthe court finds it necessary to excuse ajuror
for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretionof
the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." (emphasis
added)); see also United States v. Beard, 161 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1250 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
11 United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir.), amendedby 854
F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hill v. United States Immigration &
Naturalization Ser., 775 F.2d 1037,1040 (9th Cir. 1985) (alteration in original));
see also Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The abuse of
discretion standard means something more than our belief that we would have
acted differently if placed in the circumstance confronting the district judge."
(citations omitted)).
" Ladien, 128 F.3d at 1056 ("To disagree with the district court's decision and
to find that the court abused its discretion are two different things. The district
court's decision must strike us as fundamentally wrong for an abuse of discretion
to occur.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Schlette, 842 F.2d at
1577 ("Under [an abuse of discretion] standard of review, this court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the district court.").
'00 Beard,161 F.3d at 1194 (quoting United States v. Egbumwe, 969 F.2d 757,
761 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Schndt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.
1980).
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A. FactualBackground
In 1997, former Arizona Governor John Fife Symington III was
indicted on twenty-three counts relating to purportedly false personal
financial statements. The financial statements had been submitted in
support of loan applications he made while a commercial real estate
developer.10' His trial by jury began on May 13, 1997, and continued
through the first week in August." Twenty-one ofthe twenty-three counts
were submitted to the jury on August 8, 1997 103 Two days later, the jury
sent a note to the trial judge that stated, "Your Honor, we respectfully
request direction. One juror has stated their [sic] final opinion prior to
review of all counts. '' 0' After discussing the matter with the parties'
attorneys, the district court judge wrote back to the jurors reminding them
of their duty to participate in meaningful discussion with each other, but
also stressed that each juror should make ls own individual determination
on the charges.' 0 s
Nine days later, on August 19, the jury sent the judge another note
explammg more fully their difficulties with one of the jurors. In particular,
the note cited the juror's "[ilnability to maintain a focus on the subject of
discussion," "[i]nability to recall topics under discussion," and "[r]efusal
to discuss views with other jurors.'1° The jurors also expressed frustration
that "[a]Ul information must be repeated two to three times to be understood, discussed, or voted on. Immediately following a vote, the juror
cannot tell us what was voted."'0 7 As a result, the jury revealed that they
"question[ed] the [juror's] ability to comprehend and focus on the
information discussed." 108 With this secondnote, thejury revealed the juror
in question as Juror Cotey, a woman in her mid-seventies.109
After again meeting with the attorneys for both sides, the trial judge
opted to interview each juror separately, with counsel present and

" 1United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id"

. Id.
10.Id.
109 Id.
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participating rthe questionmg.11 Durngthese interviews, all ofthejurors
(with the exception of Juror Cotey) agreed that the note correctly represented their concerns."' Each juror also articulated specific individual
events that fueled their overall concerns about Juror Cotey's ability to
properly deliberate." 2 In addition to the testimony of the jurors, the trial
judge's law clerks informed the judge that Juror Cotey had "needed
assistance from another juror when asked to return a copy of an exhibit,
was confused as to whether she was an alternate or regular juror, and
needed help completing the lunch menu.""'
When the judge had completed interviews with all jurors, he heard
arguments from the attorneys on both sides. 114 Subsequent to these
arguments, the court rendered its decision regarding Juror Cotey. While
noting that "no juror should yield a thoughtfully-held position simply to
arrive at a verdict,"' ' the court decided to dismiss Juror Cotey for "just
cause," finding she was "either unwilling or unable to deliberate with her
colleagues.""' 6
At Symington's request, the judge seated one of the alternative jurors
in Cotey's place on the next day, and instructed the newly-altered jury to
begin its deliberations anew." 7 On September 3,1997-fourteen days after
the substitution of the alternate juror and twenty-six days after the jury
initially began deliberations-the jury completed its consideration."' It
convicted Symmgton on seven counts, acquitted irm on three, and
deadlocked on the remaining eleven." 9 The trial court, after granting
Symington's motion for acquittal on one of the seven counts, sentenced
him to thirty months imprisonment, and subsequently dismissed the eleven
nustried counts without prejudice as violative of the Speedy Trial Act.2 0
Symington timely appealed is conviction and sentence, and the government cross-appealed on other issues.'

I10
Id.
"I'Id.
"12 Seeid.at 1093-96 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); nfra notes 125-30 and accompanying text; mnfra note 141.
"34 Symington, 195 F.3d at 1094 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 1096 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
's Id.at 1084.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118

Id.

119 Id.

,20 Speedy Trhal Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994).
121 See 8yrmigton, 195 F.3d at 1084. The government's cross-appeal dealt with
the trial judge's post-verdict acquittal on one of the counts, as well as the court's
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B. Holding
Upon a review ofthe trial court's findings, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that the lower court had acted improperly when it dismissed Juror
Cotey for "justcause" under Rule 23(b). Dealing with a scenario new to the
court, the Ninth Circuit determined that, in such a post-submission
situation, "if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that
the inpetus for a juror's dismissal stems from the juror's views on the
merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror."1 The court
likened the "reasonable possibility" of this test to the standard of "reasonable doubt" in criminal law generally, which made the threshold for
dismissal a firm belief that the motive for ajuror's removal was unrelated
to that juror's position on the merits." Applying this new standard, the
court ruled that the trial court had incorrectly applied Rule 23(b) in
discharging Juror Cotey because "it was reasonably possible that the
impetus for Juror Cotey's dismissal came from her position on the merits
124
ofthe case."'
Central to the Ninth Circuit's decision to reverse the lower court's
discharge of Juror Cotey were statements by Jurors Witter and Bamond
taken during thejudge's individual interview sessions.1" In its opinon, the
court stated, "Juror Witter asked the district judge to dismiss [Juror] Cotey
because otherwise the result would be 'an undecided vote, a hung jury.'
Juror Bamond complained that because of Cotey, 'we are blocked and
blocked and blocked. And I don't want to be blocked any more.' ,,126
However, this characterization ofthe two jurors' statements is taken out of
context, and is not entirely accurate. Juror Witter, in response to the trial
judge's question whether there was anything the court might do to help
alleviate the problems with the eventually-dismissed Juror Cotey,
responded:
Well, I said there's probably the only things [sic] we can do and that
would be completely go through the process like you instructed us to, but

dismissal of the eleven mistried counts for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. See
id. at 1089-92. The issues on cross-appeal, however, do not overlap the concerns
of a Rule 23(b) juror dismissal and are thus insignificant for purposes of this Note.
1' Id. at 1087
2 Id. at 1087 n.5.
24 Id. at 1088.
2
' s See id.
12

Id.
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I do know what the outcome is going to be, other than a few items that
we--we do mutually agree upon. And that would be an undecided vote,
a hung jury or I don't know-if there was a replacement person that can
come in,
I don't know the process of how that works.' 7

As Juror Witter's comment reveals, he made no specific request to
dismiss Juror Cotey, but simply stated-n response to the trial judge's
question-that he viewed a hung jury as the inevitable result of deliberations with Cotey and saw her replacement as a viable option to avoid this
fate. His statement, while clearly establishing that he viewed Juror Cotey
as an obstacle to a verdict, made no allusion to a belief that her position on
the case merits was preventing a verdict. In fact, Juror Witter never once
cited Juror Cotey's beliefs as a hindrance, but instead proffered examples
showing her incapacity to carry out her duties. Specifically, Juror Witter
stated that one juror had to explain to Juror Cotey everything that was
happening, that the jurors had to constantly refresh her memory, and that
Juror Cotey often changed her mind after voting. ' As such, Juror Witter's
statement reinforces the notion that the obstacle to a decision was Juror
Cotey's inability to effectively deliberate, not her position on the merits.
Furthermore, this out of context citation by the court "ignored the bulk of
Witter's testimony which supports the trial judge's ultimate decision."1 9
Likewise, Juror Bamond's partial statement about the jury being
"blocked and blocked and blocked"" was ambiguous at best and provided
no indication that substantive disagreements with Cotey fueled his
frustration. With tis statement, Bamond nught very well have been
indicating that the jury was blocked from effectively deliberating, or
considering other counts, or voting on counts."' Juror Bamond, like Juror
Witter, also testified at length regarding Juror Cotey's inability to
deliberate-pointing out that she "had 'tangents off line,' asked what the
jury was talking about after a discussion was completed," ' was unsure
what had been voted on, and sometimes did not comprehend or know
where the jury was.' Consequently, Juror Bamond's statement, like Juror
127 Id. at

128
Id.
29

1094 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1097 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); see also supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
30 Symington,
195 F.3d at 1088.
131 See id. at 1097 (Fitzgerald, 3., dissenting).
132 Id at 1095 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
33
' Id. at 1095-96 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
1
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Witter's statement, does not adequately support the Ninth Circuit's finding
that "it was reasonably possible that the impetus for Juror Cotey's
134
dismissal came from her position on the merits of the case."
Although not used as a justification for the majority's holding, the
jury's first note likewise fails to support the result. While the first note's
intimation that "[o]ne juror has stated their [sic] final opinion prior to
review of all counts"' 135 might on its face indicate that Juror Cotey
disagreed with her colleagues, the note's explanatoryvalue was superseded
by the second note and individual interviews. The first note was imprecise
and devoid of anecdotal support or explanation. The second note served to
elaborate upon the first,136 and the juror interviews subsequent to this note
delineated the jury's difficulties even further. 137 Not only does the detail
provided in the second note and juror interviews fail to provide any
indication that substantive disagreements fueled the dismissal, it actually
establishes conclusively that Juror Cotey's mability to deliberate led to her
dismissal.138 In this context, the note fails to provide a "reasonable
possibility" that Juror Cotey disagreed with the rest of the jury on the case
merits.
Possibly recognizing the weak evidentiary grounds supporting its
finding, the Ninth Circuit rationalized that the other jurors may not have
even realized that their complaints about Juror Cotey arose from her views
139
on the case merits, but that these complaints nonetheless did so emanate.
The court defended tls assertion by maintaining that "it was only because
of their disagreement with Cotey on the merits that the other jurors had
occasion to question her ability to deliberate... Had Cotey tendedto agree
with the otherjurors on all points, they probably would never have noticed
her alleged mability to defend or explain her views.1 40
Ttus logic, however, fails for two reasons. First, maintaining that the
jury's questions about Juror Cotey's ability to deliberate could only have
arisenbecause of a disagreement with her on the case merits ignores the
possibility that she simply was not lucid enough to deliberate at all. There
was ample evidence presented during the judge's interviews with the
jurors, as well as from the judge's own law clerks, that Juror Cotey was not

3

Id. at 1088.

135 Id. at 1083.
3

See supranotes 106-09 and accompanying text.
137 See supranotes 127-34 and accompanying text; infra note 141.
131 See SUpra 106-09, 127-34 and accompanying text; infra note 141.
139Syrington, 195 F.3d at 1088.
0
14
Id. at 1088 n.8.
11
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rational or coherent enough to effectively deliberate.14 ' The jurors, M their
interviews with thejudge and attorneys, each individually and consistently
painted a clear picture of Cotey as ajuror who was unaware of the subject
of discussion, made unrelated statements and asked unrelated questions,
was unable to remember her vote, and required help from her fellow

141See

supranotes 105-13, 127, 131-32and accompanying text.
In their interviews with the district judge, Juror Cotey's fellow jurors gave
numerous examples of her inability to deliberate. Juror Carlson stated that Juror
Cotey was very inattentive, would go into "rambling discourses," had trouble
remembering what was being discussed, and provided answers unrelated to
questions asked ofher. JurorTejadasatdthat JurorCotey asked questions unrelated
to the debate, was unable to recall what was under discussion, made unrelated
comments and isolated herself from her colleagues.
Juror Witter told the judge that one juror had to explain to Juror Cotey
everything that was occurring, that thejurors had to repeatedly refresh her memory,
and that she often changed her mind on an issue after she had already voted. Juror
Smith testified that Juror Cotey was unable to immediately recall what she had just
voted on, and looked for exhibits or testimony unrelated to the issue being
discussed. Juror Seaman stated that Juror Cotey strayed from the issue being
discussed, alluded to things unrelated to the discussion, needed to have another
juror explain things to her, did not understand the evidence; refused to discuss her
views, and would frequently "drift off."
Juror Streeter likewise testified that Juror Cotey was unable to concentrate
on the subject of discussion and could not recall what was being discussed, would
ask questions unrelated to the topic of discussion, was unable to formulate her
views into words, and was unable to comprehend what the jury was doing. Juror
Thompson also maintained that Juror Cotey did not comprehend what the jury was
doing, was inattentive, was unable to discuss the subject at issue, made unrelated
statements, and needed everything to be explained three or four times. In his
interview, Juror Robinson testified that Juror Cotey was unable to comprehend
what the jury was doing, could not follow the discussion, made random
comments, and did not want to participate despite the jury's efforts to help her
understand and participate. Juror Pettas asserted that Juror Cotey was unable to
understand the discussion even if it was explained to her two or three times, did not
comprehend everything, and was unable to recall what she hadjust voted on. Juror
Hartle stated that Juror Cotey did not comprehend the events around her, was
unaware of what issue was being discussed, and could not recall what issue had just
been voted on. Finally, Juror Bamond recalled that Juror Cotey demed voting a
certain way after a tally, was sometimes unaware of her surroundings, and made
comments unrelated to the discussion. Symington, 195 F.3d at 1093-96 (Fitzgerald,
J., dissenting).
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jurors. 4 2 The concerns expressed repeatedly by the individual jurors spoke
to basic capacity to function as ajuror, not a particular stance on the merits.
.The second factual element that runs contrary to the Ninth Circuit's
reversal was that the jury was out for eleven days before Cotey was
dismissed and replaced, and fourteen days after the alternate juror was
substituted.143 That the post-substitution jury deliberated longer than the
pre-substitution jury suggests that Juror Cotey's dismissal was not the
result of her colleagues' desire to nd themselves of a lone holdout. Further
corroborating this conclusion, the post-Cotey jury ultimately convicted
Symington on only seven of the twenty-three counts, while acquitting him
on three counts and deadlocking on the remaining eleven. 1 "
As this mixed verdict shows, this was clearly not the "lone holdout"
situation intimated by the Ninth Circuit. Given the time taken to deliberate
and the fragmented nature of the eventual verdict, it is apparent that the
post-Cotey jury was not markedly more successful in reaching consensus
than the Coteyjury. Cotey's departure didnot alleviate thejury's continued
disagreement on at leist eleven ofthe twenty-three counts, so her dismissal
could not have been motivated by a desire to eliminate her as a holdout to
an otherwise unanimous verdict.
Furthermore, since the ultimate vote was so fragmented and far from
unanmnous, it is impossible that Cotey could have disagreed with all of her
fellow jurors on every count. With a vote so split, she would have at the
very least agreed with one of her colleagues on each of the eleven
deadlocked counts, 14s yet her fellow jurors were unanimous in criticizing
See supra note 141; Symington, 195 F.3d at 1093-96 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
143 See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
'44 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
145 There does exist a theoretical possibility that Juror Cotey was the lone
holdout for acquittal on all counts. However, such a scenario requires not only that
her replacement likewise remain the lone holdout for acquittal on the eleven
mistried counts, but also that he convince the other jurors to acquit Symmgton on
three counts and vote to convict on seven counts. The occurrence of such a
possibility, while theoretically possible, would be against tremendous odds and
therefore is too remote to merit serious attention.
A somewhat more likely (yet still improbable) scenario makes Juror Cotey the
lone holdout for acquittal on the seven counts upon wich Symington was found
guilty or the lone holdout for conviction on the three counts that were ultimately
decided m Symmgton's favor. This scenario, although more conceivable than the
first, does not solve the problem that Cotey would have had to align her vote with
one of the two stalemated sides on the eleven deadlocked counts, which would
142
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her mability to function as a juror. If a group of jurors had wanted to
eliminate Cotey because of a disagreement with her views, those other
jurors who agreed with Cotey on at least one count would have likely
objected to her removal. 1" This never happened, however, as no juror
even hinted that Cotey's position on the merits was a reason for her
dismissal.
Truly, "nothing in the findings alludes to Juror Cotey's position on the
merits of the case, and nothing in the findings suggests that the inpetus for
Juror Cotey's removal came from her position on the merits."147 There was
no evidence that she favored acquittal (if she indeed did), or that the trial
judge knew of her position on the merits. 148 The complaint by the other
jurors was not that Juror Cotey was stuck on an unpopularposition, but that
she had no discernable position at all. 149 As such, the trial court acted
justifiably in dismissing Juror Cotey.
Further calling into doubt the reversal of Symington's conviction, the
Ninth Circuit's review of the trial court's dismissal of a juror under Rule
23(b) was supposed to have been limited to a cursory exam for an "abuse
of discretion.""15 Under this standard, a decision may only be reversed
when it "is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or when the record
contains no evidence on which [the court] rationally could have based that
decision."'1' The reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for the
trial court's,'s and reversal under an abuse of discretion standard requires

create within these allies a disincentive to her removal.
1"Again, it is theoretically possible that there existed no deadlock on the eleven
mistned counts until after Cotey departed. Such asituationwould, however, require
a dramatic shifting of votes between Cotey's substitution and the ultimate verdict.
See supra note 145.
147 ymington, 195 F.3d at 1097 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
141 The court evidently believed that the trial judge was able to avoid learning
any jurors'
views on the merits. See id. at 1086 n.4.
149 See supra note 141.
150 See United States v. Beard, 161 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998); Perez v
Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d
1245, 1250 (1lth Cir. 1990); see also FED. P. CRiM. P 23(b) ("Mf the court finds
it necessary to excuse ajuror forjust cause after thejury has retired to consider its
verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the
remaining 1 1jurors." (emphasis added)).
151 United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir.), amended by 854
F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988).
" Id. ("Under [an abuse of discretion] standard of review, this court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the district court.").
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more than a belief by the reviewing court that it would have acted
differently if placed m the trial judge's position. 15 3 Using this very
deferential standard of review,' 4 the appeals court must affirm the
judgment of the lower court unless it is "left with the definite and firm
conviction that the court committed a clear error of judgment in reaching
its conclusion after weighing the relevant factors." ' Furthermore, in the
context of reviewing post-submission juror dismissal, "(t]he judgment of
the trial judge, who can appraise the jurors face to face, deserves great
15 6
weight."
Despite the abuse of discretion standard under which the appellate
court's inquiry was supposed to have occurred, the Ninth Circuit used its
newly-anomted "reasonable possibility" test" to evaluate the district
court's determination anew."
To justify its departure from the abuse of discretion standard mandated
in Rule 23 reviews, the Ninth Circuit rationalized that the trial court was in
no better position to evaluate the reason for the request for a juror's
dismissal because of the strict limits on the trial court's mquiry 159
Consequently, the court deduced, the district court would likely be unable
to establish definitively the reasons underlying the dismissal request, and
unlike the typical case, would not be in the best position to evaluate the
juror's ability to effectively deliberate. 16°

1' Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1056 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The abuse of
discretion standard means something more than our belief that we would have
acted differently if placed in the circumstance confronting the district judge.").
I" See id. ("To disagree with the district court's decision and to find that the
court abused its discretion are two different things. The district court's decision
must strike us as fundamentally wrong for an abuse of discretion to occur.").
155 Beard,161 F.3d at 1194 (quoting United States v. Egbumwe, 969 F.2d 757,
761 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Schmidtv. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.
1980).
156 United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1996).
17
1 See supranotes 121-23 and accompanymg text.
151 United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1999).
'59 See id. at 1086. Once deliberations have begun, a trial judge is prohi1bited
from delving into the substance of the jury's discussions or any juror's positions
on the merits or mental processes. See id.at 1087; cf FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The
court in Symington went so far as to praise the trial judge for "scrupulously
avoiding any discussion ofjurors' views on the merits when he questioned them
about Juror Cotey," Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086 n.4, yet still disregarded his
firsthand view of the jurors' testimony.
160 Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086.
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This logic is flawed, however, because the trial judge, although
prohibited from mquirng into the jurors' mental processes, still maintains
the unique position of evaluating the jurors face to face. Much like the
preference given live witnesses over deposition testimony at trial,'16 the
district court judge's face to face evaluation of the jurors deserves
preference over the appeals court's evaluation of written transcripts and
attorney arguments.162 Ignoring this preference, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated the trial court's decision as if it were the court's own. Consequently,

the Ninth Circuit not only disregarded the abuse of discretion evidentiary
standard applicable in Rule 23(b) situations, but also ignored the broad
preference for the trial court's face-to-face evaluation of the jurors.
IV POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES V SYMJNGTON
The central policy ramification of UnitedStates v. Syington'63 comes
from the precedential value ofthe standard applied to the dismissal request.
Upon a cursory examination, the court's aadition ofthe word"reasonable"
to the standard used by the Second and D.C. Circuits164 (requiring a
dismissal request to be denied "if the record evidence discloses any
possibility" that it stems from the juror's substantive views on the case)
seemed to lessen the barrier to post-subnssionjuror removal.161In fact, the

161See

FED. R. CRIM. P 15; see also Griman v. Makousky, 76 F.3d 151, 153
(7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Marcos, No. SSSS 87 CR. 598 JFK, 1990 WL
58825, at *2 (S.D.N.Y May 1, 1990); United States v. Ontiveros-Lucero, 621 F
Supp. 1037, 1038 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
1
1 See United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The judgment of
the trial judge, who can appraise the jurors face to face, deserves great weight").

6 Symington, 195 F.3d at 1080.
" See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591,596 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
" It is debatable whether the insertion of the word "reasonable" makes any
substantive difference m the application of the standard. The Symington majority
apparently perceived a genuine difference between the standards, as it noted that
the "any possibility" standard could potentially bar dismissal in all cases where a
juror's thought processes are involved. See Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087 n.5. It is
also possible, however, that reasonableness is implicit in the test of Brown and
Thomas, so the Ninth Circuit's addition is of marginal practical value. SeeBrown,
823 F.2d at 596 (reversing because of a "substantial possibility" that the juror in
question was discharged because oftus position on the merits); see alsoSymington,
195 F.3d at 1087 n.5 (quoting United States v. Watkins, 983 F.2d 1413, 1424 (7th
Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, L,dissenting)) (stating that "[a]nythng is possible m a
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court itself claimed to relax the standard for establishing"just cause" under
Rule 23(b) when a juror's thought processes are involved."s Quite the
contrary was true, however, as the court's application of the standard in
Symington rendered any future successful use ofthe test nearly impossible.
Applying this ostensibly easier test, the Ninth Circuit still held that a
reasonable possibility existed that the juror in question had been inproperly dismissed based upon her views of the merits-despite no concrete
evidence to support that conclusion. 67 As a practical matter, the Ninth
Circuit made the seemingly more relaxed standard all but a complete bar
to substitution by reversing the trial court's substitution decision based on
"considerable evidence"' that consisted of nothing more than two partial
sentences from two of the jurors. 69
Such a strict application ofthe "justcause" standardwas not warranted.
Although the Ninth Circuit looked to the Second and D.C. Circuits for
guidance, neither court was so harsh in its evaluation. Both the Second and
D.C. Circuits could point to clearly defined examples where the dismissed
juror showed substantive doubts, and both reliedheavily on these instances
as justification for reversal. In United States v. Brown,170 the dismissed
juror spoke of doubts about the prosecution's evidence and indicated an
unwillingness to convict based upon the evidence presented.' In United
States v. Thomas," there were several indications that the dismissed juror
harbored doubts about the sufficiency ofthe evidence presented at trial, and
four of the juror's colleagues testified that hIs disagreements with the other
jurors were based upon these doubts.' m Furthermore, both Brown and

world of quantum mechamcs"); cf United States v. Siam, 2000 WL 1130084, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9,2000) (noting that any distinction between theBrown-Thomas
test and the Symngton test would prove Trrelevant m that case). In any event, the
addition marks an nprovement over the prior version, since it makes explicit a
criterion
that was likely inplicit m the prior version of the test.
166 See Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087 n.5.
16 7 See id. at 1097-98 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); supraPart JII.B.
1 See Symington,
195 F.3d at 1088.
'9See id. The jury's first note could arguably support this conclusion as well.
However, the court didn't use the note as a basis for its conclusion, see id., and the
jury's second note and subsequent interviews clarified the meaning of the first note
by setting forth the impetus behind it, see id. at 1083; id. at 1093-96 (Fitzgerald,
L, dissenting); supranotes 134-38 and accompanying text.
170 Brown, 823 F.2d at 591.
171 Id. at 594.
"
United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
73
See id at 610-11.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 89

Thomas presented situations ofalone holdout for acquittal-a scenario that
was absent from the Symington case.' 74 In Symington, there was no
evidence that either was true, yet the Ninth Circuit reversed Symington's
conviction.
Not only was such a strict application of the "just cause" standard
unwarranted, it also represented a dangerous precedent. By finding an
absence of "just cause" m a situation where the dismissed juror truly
seemed to lack lucidity- the court established a rule making dismissal
nearly impossible where ajuror's thought processes are at issue. Under the
Ninth Circuit standard, dismissal would be improper whenever it is
theoreticallypossible that a juror-harbored substantive doubts about the
case-with or without any real evidence as to the juror's actual beliefs.
Under this rationale, even if conclusive proofexists that the juror was unfit
for deliberations, a judge is nonetheless forbidden from dismissing that
juror where there is no definitive prejudicial event. For example, the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning would prevent trial judges from dismissing jurors of
dubious competency without definitive proof that that juror's views on the
merits did not lead to requests for dismissal. Conclusively proving a
negative proposition such as tus is quite difficult even under normal
circumstances, and doing so without infringing upon the protection ofjuror
secrecy is an entirely impossible task.
Compounding the importance of the Symington holding is the
infrequency with which this type of situation occurs. With most cases
confronting post-submission juror substitution stemming from a single
readily-definable event, the Ninth Circuit's decision would likely be
afforded great weight by other courts dealing with this issue.
CONCLUSION

"Just cause" for dismissal under Rule 23(b), by its very nature, is an
amorphous concept. Its meaning and application have been continually
defined and redefined by the courts that employ it. However, since its
inception, the phrase has met a more and more liberal definition. Both trial
and appellate courts, as well as the Rule writers themselves, have increasingly construed 'just cause" to facilitate judicial economy, and have
abandoned prior arguments that more liberal constructions of Rule 23 and
Rule 24 would violate criminal defendants' constitutional rights.
With this backdrop in mind, the Ninth Circuit's decision is quite
perplexing. On one hand, it claims to lessen the requirements for "just
74 See

supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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cause" with its "reasonable possibility" test. This relaxation is consistent
with the need to promote judicial economy evidenced by the evolution of
Rules 23(b) and 24(c). On the other, however, the court's stringent
application of this standard to the facts of United States v. Symington
precludes the test's usefulness. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit effectively
created a more "relaxed" standard that was more difficult to fulfill than the
one it replaced. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's test has the practical effect of
creating an insurmountable obstacle to post-submssion juror substitution
in situations involving a juror's thought processes. Courts unable to point
to a clearly defined, self-evident mcident justifying removal are powerless
under the Symington decision to find "just cause" for dismissing an
incompetent juror where that juror's thought processes are implicated.
The Symington case presented numerous examples of Juror Cotey's
mability to function as a juror, yet her dismissal could not withstand the
Ninth Circuit's rigorous application of the "reasonable possibility"
standard. Because the facts of Symington so clearly pointed to juror
incompetence and the Ninth Circuit refusedto allow dismissal, the decision
renders inpossible a rightful dismissal of an incompetent juror when the
justification for dismissal does not come from an external event. After all,
if the Symington facts could not leave one "firmly convinced that the
impetus for ajuror's dismissal is unrelated to her position on the merits," 175
it is difficult to imagme a realistic set of facts that would. Effectively
precluding any post-submissionjuror substitution that is not based on some
clearly-defined, self-evident event, the Syimngton decision has derailed the
trend toward judicial economy and overinflated defendants' Rule 23(b)
protections.
The application of the "reasonable possibility" standard should reflect
common sense. "Reasonable possibility" means more than a theoretical
academic chance, but a genuine possibility under the present circumstances. Contrary to the holding bythe Symington majority, there is no need
for theoretical or hypothetical situations when all facts indicate that ajuror
is not a lone holdout. The application of a legal standard such as this
"reasonable possibility" test should not be made without at least some
deference to common sense. 176

United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999).
See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he logic of words should yield to the logic of realities.").
175
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